The familiar concept of Pigouvian taxes has finally caught the interest of politicians as the various proposals for a pollution tax often simplified to an energy tax, document. This paper reviews these proposals critically and points at some wrong presumptions. The suggestion to make the polluter liable for all damages is in general inefficient. In order to sell new taxes, politicians argue that Pigouvian taxes would not lower disposable income, because the associated revenues allow one to reduce other taxes (in particular, income taxes) correspondingly. However, strategic, noncompetitive energy producers may themselves attempt to ＇＇internalize the external costs＇＇ rather than to leave these tax revenues to the treasuries of the consuming countries. Moreover, the revenues from a commodity tax are potentially volatile. Finally, the conservation impact from Pigouvian energy taxes may fall short of expectations, in particular, if the tax is too ＇＇low.＇＇