We examined 20 renewable energy auctions in India and elsewhere to answer two questions: first, have auctions been effective; and second, how can they be designed to achieve India's renewable energy targets? The significant contributions lie in the larger sample size, use of secondary and primary research, and application of quantitative and qualitative analysis. We found that auctions are almost always cost-effective, with savings up to 58% from baseline feed-in tariffs. However, auctions may not always be deployment-effective, with only 17% of the auctions with greater than 75% deployment. We then examined how to best design auctions by assessing seven major risks, and found the following: first, for every 1% increase in total risk, deployment effectiveness decreased by 2% points; second, project specific risks have 60% greater impact than auction specific risks; and third, deployment effectiveness is most affected by auction design, completion, and financial risks. We also found that effectiveness of auctions in India can be improved by ensuring competition, improving transmission infrastructure, providing payment guarantees, using pay-as-bid auctions, including stringent penalties for delays, and introducing auctions in a controlled manner. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.