The financial success of the chemical and petrochemical industry will increasingly depend upon the security of process control systems. This paper presents recommendations and insights gleaned from over 100 security risk assessment (SRA) and process control analyses, using requirements baselines extracted from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) special publication 800-53 (and Appendix A), the Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, in conjunction with NIST special publication 800-82, Guide to Industrial Control Systems(ICS) Security, to provide the bridge in application of 800-53 controls to IC/SCADA. The paper identifies how current and projected malevolent threats posed by insiders, outsiders, collusion, and system-induced threats can erode system performance in terms of shut downs, sabotage, production disruption, and contamination. The issue is not whether there are clear and present cyber threats, nor whether there are business prudent practices that can be implemented to counter those threats; but rather that there is such a diverse compendium, at times conflicting and often technically obtuse guidance, that clarity is needed to narrow the focus of this guidance to assist those responsible for implementing effective process control security. The paper focuses on application of business-prudent controls and discusses how disparities in implementation of controls can exacerbate system vulnerabilities. Topics include issues of processes control system management, systems documentation, use of contractors and remote contractor access, system authorities that exceed user needs, misalignment of staff perception of information asset values, exposures related to use of USB ports, lack of encryption, and background surety gaps for individuals and contractor companies with access to process control systems. The paper examines the dynamics of communicating information from process control systems to business IT systems and the pressure from business operations to capture process data and make it available in near real-time through administrative networks. Such pressures may influence systems administrators to overlook or ignore firewall and systems engineering architecture, increasing potentials for two-way interface between business and process control that significantly increases exploit exposures. Despite the availability of excellent guidelines for physical and technical security of IT related assets, these practices are too often unheeded in favor of expediency or expanded access. The paper includes a discussion of Risk Management Framework models that should be considered to enhance the correspondences and relationships between multiple organizational domains, thereby promoting more effective cyber security for current and future process control systems. The paper summarizes the process for establishing security for industrial control systems (ICS), and addresses cyber security baseline requirements and expectations, within a risk management framework that provides a decision basis, threat dynamics, common vulnerabilities, and prudent mitigation measures. Much of this summary has been derived from The Information Technology Laboratory at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and NIST SP 800-82, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. NIST has also published Applying NIST SP 800-53 to Industrial Control Systems which demonstrates the relationship of 800-53 to ICS security and the application of more than 20 control families and over 625 control elements to ICS security. Although originally designed for Federal systems, portions of these publications also provide a solid foundation for critical commercial and industrial information control systems in terms of addressing the basic questions that companies in the process industry should consider when selecting security controls, including: What controls are actually needed to protect process systems, while supporting operations and safeguarding critical assets? Can the selected controls suggested for Federal systems effectively be implemented for systems in the process industry? Once selected and implemented, will these controls really be effective in protecting the processes? NIST SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems, helps answer questions to strengthen commercial processes information security programs. The security controls articulated in NIST SP 800-53 provide guidance and recommend practices applicable to security systems in process industries, to provide a foundation for understanding the fundamental concepts of security controls. The introductory material presents the concept of security controls and their use within well-defined information security programs. Some of the issues discussed include the structural components of controls, how the controls are organized into families, and the use of controls to support information security programs. The guide outlines the essential steps that should be followed to determine needed controls, to assure the effectiveness of controls, and to maintain the effectiveness of installed controls. The appendices in NIST SP 800-53 provide additional resources including general references, definitions, explanation of acronyms, a breakdown of security controls for graduated levels of security requirements, a catalog of security controls, and information relating security controls to other standards and control sets. The controls are organized into classes of operational, management, and technical controls, and then into families within each class. To maintain parity and applicability with advances in technology, NIST also plans to review and to update the controls in the catalog as technology changes and new safeguards and new information security countermeasures are identified. NIST SP 800-53 and related documents are available at http://csrc.nistgov/publications/nistpubs/index.html. The extensive reference list in SP 800-53 includes standards, guidelines, and recommendations that process industry companies can use as the foundation for comprehensive security planning and lifecycle management processes. Additionally, a significant effort of broad commercial and government cooperation, the Consensus Audit Guideline (CAG) provides a 20-element cyber security controls roster supporting a common commercial framework for cyber security, correlating to the NIST 800-53 Control Library. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.