The Bhopal gas tragedy occurred in December 1984 wherein approximately 41 tonnes of deadly MIC was released in the dead of night. It caused the death of over 3000 people and continued life-long misery for over 300,000 with certain genetic defects passed on to the next generation. It happened in a plant operated by a multinational, Union Carbide Corporation, in a developing country, India. The tragedy has changed the chemical process industry (CPI) forever. The results have been new legislation with better enforcement, enhancement in process safety, development of inherently safer plants, harsher court judgements, pro-active media and NGOs, rights-conscious public, and a CPI management willing to invest in safety related equipment and training. These have already resulted in savings of several hundred lives and over a billion dollars in accident damages [Kletz, T. (1998a). Process plants: a handbook of inherently safer designs. London: Taylor & Francis. Sutton, I. Chemical Engineering, 106(5), (1999). 114]. However, thousands did not have to die for the world to realise the disaster potential of CPI. The question that still remains is whether such an accident could have happened in a developed country. The answer is `yes', as a number of major accidents in the developed countries since 1984, such as the Piper Alpha oil platform fire (1988, 167 killed), the Zeebrugge ferry disaster (1987, 167 killed), Phillips petroleum fire and explosion (1989, 23 killed), the Challenger disaster (1986, 7 killed), Esso Australia Longford explosion (1998, 2 killed) have demonstrated. One or more of the following are the primary reasons for such disasters: The indifferent attitude of the management towards safety, the lax enforcement of the existing regulations by the regulatory bodies as well as unusual delays in the judicial systems. Such conditions can happen regardless of the level of development in a country. Hence, the Bhopal gas tragedy could have happened in a developed country too, albeit with a lower probability. This paper is concerned with the possibility and not with the probability value. It also points out that further significant advances in process safety will occur with fundamental research into the causes of accidents and with a move towards inherently safer design.