This paper models the adoption of commercial building energy codes in the US between 1977 and 2006. Energy code adoption typically results in an increase in aggregate social welfare by cost effectively reducing energy expenditures. Using a Cox proportional hazards model, I test if relative state funding, a new, objective, multivariate regression-derived measure of government capacity, as well as a vector of control variables commonly used in comparative state research, predict commercial building energy code adoption. The research shows little political influence over historical commercial building energy code adoption in the sample. Colder climates and higher electricity prices also do not predict more frequent code adoptions. I do find evidence of high government capacity states being 60 percent more likely than low capacity states to adopt commercial building energy codes in the following year. Wealthier states are also more likely to adopt commercial codes. Policy recommendations to increase building code adoption include increasing access to low cost capital for the private sector and providing noncompetitive block grants to the states from the federal government. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.